While many interpreters hold that Hegel avoided the traditional problem of free will, Yeomans argues both that the problem is unavoidable, and that the two versions of the Logic fruitfully engage the tensions between explicability and both the control and alternate possibilities constitutive of free agency. There are many insightful discussions of Hegel's practical philosophy that emphasize the uniqueness of his expressivist and social theory of agency, but fewrecognize that these two aspects of Hegel's theory of the will are insufficient to avoid the traditional problem of free will. In fact, the problem can easily be shown to recur in the very language used to express why Hegel's theoryis a theory of freedom at all. In part, this lack of recognition results from the fact thatthere has not yet been a study of Hegel's theory of the will that has formulated the problem against the background of the contemporary literature on free will, where basic concerns about the explicability of action loom large. By using the continuity between the contemporary concerns and those ofHegel's predecessors (particularly Kant), Yeomans shows the necessity of reference to the Logic in order to supplement Hegel's own practical philosophy andthe scholarship based on it. In addition to adding significantly to our understanding of Hegel's theory of agency and recapturing its significance with respect to continuing modern reflection on free will, this study also shows thatHegel's Logic can do some real philosophical work on a specific problem.Though Hegel's logical terminology is notorious for its impenetrability, Yeomans translates Hegel's jargon into a more easily comprehensible vocabulary. Hefurther helps the reader by providing introductory discussions framing the central issues of each chapter both in terms of the problem of free will and in terms of the development of Hegel's argument to that point in the Logic. Presenting the reader with frequent use of examples, Yeomans leavens the abstractness of Hegel's presentation andmakes the topic accessible to readers new to Hegel as well as those well versed in his work. AcknowledgementsAbbreviationsPart I: IntroductionChapter 1: Hegel and Free Will1.1: Hegel and the Traditional Problem of Free Will1.2: Hegel's Theory of Free WillChapter 2: The Problem of Expression as the Problem of Reflection2.1: Introduction2.2: Internal and External Determination in the Doctrine of Being2.3: Internal and External Determination in the Concept of Reflection2.4: Elements of the Theory of Reflection in Hegel's Moral Psychology2.5: The Shape of the ProjectPart II: Agency as Self-ExplanationChapter 3: The Externality of Explanations and the Problem of an Infinite RegressChapter 4: Self-Explanation as the Basic Form of Explanation4.1: Ground as Expression4.2: Internal and External Determination in Explanations4.3: The Argument for Explanation as a Three-Term Relation4.4: The Role of Conditions as the Third Term in Explanation4.5: The Infection of Internality by the Conditions4.6: Holism about ExplanationChapter 5: The Agent as a Locus of Self-ExplanationPart III: Agency as True NecessityChapter 6: The Necessity of Action and the Problem of Alternate PossibilitiesChapter 7: Modality in Hegel's Logic7.1: Modality as the Structure of Self-Expression7.2: Contingency as a Unity of Actuality and Possibility7.3: The Modal Continuum7.4: The Necessity of Alternate PossibilitiesChapter 8: Agency as True Necessity8.1: Willkr and Wille8.2: The Modal Argument for Hegel's Conception of the Free WillPart IV: Agency as Teleological Reciprocal InteractionChapter 9: The Mechanistic Challenge and the Problem of PassivityChapter 10: Teleology, Mechanism and Causation10.1: The Question of Priority10.2: Productivity as Expression10.3: Freedom as Substance-Causation10.4: The Passivity of Mechanical Causation10.5: Causation as Reciprocal Interaction10.6: Reciprocal Interaction as Freedom10.7: The Teleological Form of Reciprocal Self-DeterminationChapter 11: Teleological Agency11.1: Arguments Against Determinism11.2: A Teleological Philosophy of ActionChapter 12: ConclusionBibliographyIndexNotes
- ISBN: 978-0-19-979452-2
- Editorial: Oxford University
- Encuadernacion: Cartoné
- Páginas: 304
- Fecha Publicación: 05/01/2012
- Nº Volúmenes: 1
- Idioma: Inglés