Daniel Russell develops the idea that a necessary part of virtue is practical intelligence, the skill of determining what the right (e.g. kind or fair) thing to do would be on a given occasion, which requires much time, experience, and practice. This idea, drawn from classical philosophy, has a key role to play in contemporary virtue ethics. One of the most important developments in modern moral philosophy is the resurgence of interest in the virtues. In this new book, Daniel Russell explores two important hopes for such an approach to moral thought: that starting from the virtues should cast light on what makes anaction right, and that notions like character, virtue, and vice should yield a plausible picture of human psychology. Russell argues that the key to each of these hopes is an understanding of the cognitiveand deliberative skills involved in the virtues. If right action is defined in terms of acting generously or kindly, then these virtues must involve skillsfor determining what the kind or generous thing to do would be on a given occasion. Likewise, Russell argues that understanding virtuous action asthe intelligent pursuit of virtuous goals yields a promising picture of the psychology of virtue. This book develops an Aristotelian account of the virtue of practical intelligence or 'phronesis'--an excellence of deliberating and making choices--which Russell argues is a necessary part of every virtue. This emphasis on the roots of the virtues in the practical intellect contrasts with ambivalence about the practical intellect in much recent work on the virtues--a trend Russell argues isultimately perilous for virtue theory. This book also takes a penetrating look at issues like the unity of the virtues, responsibility for character, and that elusive figure, 'the virtuous person'. Written in a clear and careful manner, Practical Intelligence and the Virtues will appeal to philosophers andstudents alike in moral philosophy and moral psychology. INDICE: Practical Intelligence and the Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach Part 1. Phronesis, Virtue, and Right Action Right Action for Virtue Ethics Right Action and Virtuous Motives Right Action and 'the Virtuous Person' Part 2. The Enumeration Problem The Enumeration Problem Individuating the Virtues Magnificence, Generosity, and Subordination Part 3. Situations, Dispositions, and Virtues Situations and Broad-Based Dispositions Situations and Dispositions: Examining the Evidence From Situationism to Virtue Theory Part 4. Defending HardVirtue Theory Phronesis and the Unity of the Virtues Responsibility for Character Works Cited Index Locorum General Index
- ISBN: 978-0-19-969844-8
- Editorial: Oxford University
- Encuadernacion: Rústica
- Páginas: 458
- Fecha Publicación: 20/10/2011
- Nº Volúmenes: 1
- Idioma: Inglés