Lucy O'Brien argues that a satisfactory account of first-person reference andself-knowledge needs to concentrate on our nature as agents. Clearly written,with rigorous discussion of rival views, this book will be of interest to anyone working in the philosophy of mind and action. INDICE: Preface; Part I.; 1: Introduction; 2: Arguments for the No-Reference View of 'I'; 3: Perceptual Models of First Person Reference; 4: The Self-Reference Rule; 5: The Agency Account; 6: Agent's Awareness and Knowledge of Our Mental Actions; Part II; 7: Introduction; 8: What are Actions?; 9: On Knowing One's Own Physical Actions; 10: Bodily Awareness; 11: Bodily Awareness andSelf-Knowledge
- ISBN: 978-0-19-959204-3
- Editorial: Oxford University
- Encuadernacion: Rústica
- Páginas: 256
- Fecha Publicación: 22/07/2010
- Nº Volúmenes: 1
- Idioma: Inglés