The first Afghan war is one of the most interesting events in British Imperial and military history. Mr Norris's starting point for this 1967 publication is the belief that Sir John William Kaye, the Victorian authority on this war, made some strong partisan judgements, which were left unanswered. He thereforere-examines the original sources, including much material that was not available to Kaye, to form the basis of a fresh interpretation. This study attempts to assess the political significance of the Afghan incident by relating it to the general Eastern question, and at the same time to vindicate the actions ofLord Auckland and Alexander Burnes. The principal unresolved problem of the war was the exact correlation of British and Indian policy over Afghanistan. MrNorris demonstrates convincingly that Auckland's policy was part of the general Whig plan, operated by Palmerston, for the containment of Russian expansionin Asia. INDICE: Acknowledgements; Map; Introduction; Part I. Anglo-Russian Rivalryto 1830: 1. Early threats to the British Empire in India; 2. Britain recognises the Russian threat; Part II. British Aims in Central Asia 1830-1838: 3. Wellington's administration and the master plan; 4. Reconnaissance along the Indus; 5. Auckland's first year in India; 6. Negotiations in Teheran and Kabul; Part III. Advance to the Hindu Kush 1838-1839: 7. Auckland breaks with Dost Muhammad; 8. British India prepares for war; 9. The Home Government supports Auckland; 10. The Army of the Indus; 11. Marching to Kandahar; 12. A king restored at Kabul; Part IV. Return to the Indus 1840-1842: 13. Victory and over-confidence; 14. The mounting cost of intervention; 15. Rising at Kabul; 16. The Army of retribution; 17. Aftermath and epilogue; Appendices; bibliography; Notes; Index.
- ISBN: 978-0-521-13096-7
- Editorial: Cambridge University
- Encuadernacion: Rústica
- Páginas: 520
- Fecha Publicación: 11/03/2010
- Nº Volúmenes: 1
- Idioma: Inglés