Game theoretic problems in network economics and mechanism design solutions

The focus of this monograph is to explore game theoretic modeling and mechanism design for problem solving in Internet and network economics. The monographis structured into two parts. The first part (Chapter 2) contains an overviewof foundational concepts and key results in mechanism design. This chapter isintended as a self-sufficient introduction to mechanism design theory with the help of numerous stylized examples from network economics. The second part of the monograph contains an exposition of representative game theoretic problems in three different network economics situations and a systematic exploration of mechanism design solutions to these problems. This part has three chapters: Chapter 3 deals with the sponsored search auction problem, Chapter 4 with the resource allocation problem in computational grids, and Chapter 5 with the robust broadcast protocol design problem in ad hoc networks. For the first time, the main theoretical issues and applications of mechanism design are bound together in a single text Currently, no other book provides a detailed discussion of application of game theory and mechanism design to research problems incomputer science and communication networks INDICE: From the contents Motivating Problems in Network Economics.- Foundations of Mechanisms Design.- Strategic Form Games.- Dominant Strategy Equilibria.- Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium.- Bayesian Games.- Social Choice Functions.- Incentive Compatibility and the Revelation Theorem.- Properties of Social Choice Functions.- Bayesian Implementation.- Revenue Equivalence Theorem.- Mechanism Design for Sponsored Search Auctions.- Internet Advertising.- SponsoredSearch Auction.- Individual Rationality.- Computational Complexity.- Mechanism Design for Resource Procurement in Grid Computing.- The G-DSIC Mechanism.- The G-BIC Mechanism.- G-OPT: An Optimal Auction Mechanism.- Incentive Compatible Broadcast Protocols for Ad hoc Networks with Selfish Nodes.- Ad hoc Networkswith Selfish Nodes.- Relevant Work on Incentive Compatible Protocols.- A Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatible Broadcast Protocol.- A Bayesian Incentive Compatible Broadcast (BIC-B) Protocol.- Key Applications Areas.

• ISBN: 978-1-84800-937-0
• Editorial: Springer
• Encuadernacion: Cartoné
• Páginas: 274
• Fecha Publicación: 01/04/2009
• Nº Volúmenes: 1
• Idioma: Inglés