This is a reissue, with new introduction, of Susan Sauv Meyer's 1993 book which presents a striking interpretation of Aristotle's accounts of voluntariness in the Eudemian and Nicomachean Ethics. She argues that they constitute a distinctive theory of moral responsibility, and provides powerful responses to notorious puzzles in the account. This is a reissue, with new introduction, of Susan Sauv Meyer's 1993 book, in which she presents a comprehensive examination of Aristotle's accounts of voluntariness in the Eudemian and Nicomachean Ethics. She makes the case that these constitute a theory of moral responsibility--albeit one with important differences from modern theories. Highlights of the discussion include a reconstruction of the dialectical argument in the Eudemian Ethics II 6-9, and a demonstration that the definitions of 'voluntary' and 'involuntary' in Nicomachean Ethics III 1 are the culmination of that argument. By identifying the paradigms of voluntariness and involuntariness that Aristotle begins with and the opponents (most notably Plato) he addresses, Meyer explains notoriously puzzling features of the Nicomacheanaccount--such as Aristotle's requirement that involuntary agents experience pain or regret. Other familiar features of Aristotle's account are cast in a new light. That we are responsible for the characters we develop turns out not to be a necessary condition of responsible agency. That voluntary action has its "origin" in the agentand that our actions are "up to us to do and not to do"--often interpreted asimplying a libertarian conception of agency--turn out to be perfectly compatible with causal determinism, a point Meyer makes by locating these locutions in the context of Aristotle's general understanding of causality. While Aristotle does not himself face or address worries that determinism is incompatible with responsibility, his causal repertoire provides the resources for a powerful response to incompatibilistarguments. On this and other fronts Aristotle's is a view to be taken seriously by theorists of moral responsibility. INDICE: Acknowledgments Abbreviations of Aristotle's Works Tables Introduction: Moral Responsibility and Aristotle's Concerns Moral Responsibility and Moral Character Voluntariness, Praiseworthiness, and Character The Dialectical Inquiry into Voluntariness Force, Compulsion, and the Internal Origin of Action Responsibility for Character: Its Scope and Significance Moral Agency and the Origination of Action Appendix I: Varieties of Knowledge and Ignorance Appendix II: "Up to Us" and the Internal Origin Bibliography General Index Index Locorum
- ISBN: 978-0-19-969742-7
- Editorial: Oxford University
- Encuadernacion: Cartoné
- Páginas: 240
- Fecha Publicación: 24/11/2011
- Nº Volúmenes: 1
- Idioma: Inglés