The oxford handbook of philosophy of mind

This is the most authoritative and comprehensive guide ever published to the state of the art in philosophy of mind, a flourishing area of research. An outstanding team of contributors offer 45 new critical surveys of a wide range oftopics. INDICE: I. The Place of Mind in Nature; 1: Jaegwon Kim: Mental Causation; 2: David Papineau: The Causal Closure of the Physical and Naturalism; 3: E.J. Lowe: Dualism; 4: Sven Walters: Epiphenomenalism; 5: Julie Yoo: Anomalous Monism; 6: Lynne Rudder Baker: Nonreductive Materialsim; 7: Robert Van Gulick:Functionalism; 8: Ansgar Beckermann: What Is Property Physicalism?; 9: Barbara Montero: What Is the Physical?; 10: Howard Robinson: Idealism; 11: William Seager: Panpsychism; II. The Nature of Consciousness and The Place of Consciousnes in Nature; 12: John Perry: Subjectivity; 13: David Rosenthal: Higher-orderTheories of Consciousness; 14: Michael Tye: Representationalist Theories of Consciousness; 15: Alex Byrne: Sensory Qualities, Sensible Qualities, Sensational Qualities; 16: Joseph Levine: The Explanatory Gap; 17: Kati Balog: Phenomenal Concepts; 18: David Chalmers: The Two-Dimensional Argument Against Materialism; III. Intentionality and Theories of Mental Content; 19: Daniel Dennett: Intentional Systems Theory; 20: Frances Egan: Wide Content; 21: Gabriel Segal: Narrow Content; 22: Fred Dretske: Information-theoretic Semantics; 23: Ruth Millikan: Biosemantics; 24: Robert Matthews: A Measurement-theoretic Account of Propositional Attitudes; 25: Ralph Wedgwood: The Normativity of the Intentional; 26: Christopher Peacocke: Concepts and Possession Conditions; 27: Jose Bermudez: The Distinction between Conceptual and Nonconceptual Content; 28: Tim Crane: Intentionalism; 29: Michelle Montague: The Content of Perceptual Experience; 30: George Graham, Terence Horgan, and John Tienson: Phenomenology, Intentionality, and the Unity of the Mind; IV. Self, Unity of Consciousness, and Personal Identity; 31: Galen Strawson: Selves; 32: Paul Raymont and Andy Brook: Unity of Consciousness; 33: Tamar Gendler: Personal Identity and Metaphysics; V. Variety of Mental Abilities; 34: Colin McGinn: Imagination; 35: Louise Antony: Thinking; 36: John Heil: Language and Thought; 37: John Campbell: Consciousness and Reference; 38: Krista Lawlor: Memory; 39: Jesse Prinz: Emotions: Motivating Feelings; 40: Alfred Mele: Intention and Intentional Action; VI. Epistemic Issues; 41: Adam Morton: Folk Psychology; 42: Anita Avramides: Other Minds; 43: Cynthia Macdonald: Introspection; 44: Jessica Brown: Semantic Externalism and Self-knowledge; 45: Kent Bach: Self-deception

• ISBN: 978-0-19-959631-7
• Editorial: Oxford University
• Encuadernacion: Rústica
• Páginas: 832
• Fecha Publicación: 20/01/2011
• Nº Volúmenes: 1
• Idioma: Inglés