Economics and the interpretation and application of U.S. and E.U. antitrust law v. II Economics-based legal analyses of mergers, vertical practices, and joint ventures

The standard economic-efficiency analysis of antitrust (1) ignores many kindsof inefficiency (e.g., the kinds generated when resources are misallocated among unit-output-increasing, quality-or-variety-increasing [QV]-investment-creating, and production-process-research [PPR]-executing uses and when the resources allocated to QV-investment creation [PPR execution] are misallocated amongareas of product-space) and (2) ignores Second-Best Theory (viz., the fact that, to determine a competition-increasing policy's impact on any kind of inefficiency, one must take appropriate account not only of the targeted competition-imperfection's tendency to cause such inefficiency in an otherwise-Pareto-perfect economy but also of the tendency of the economy's other Pareto imperfections to cause such inefficiency and the way in which the relevant Pareto imperfections interact to cause such inefficiency). This book develops a 'distortion-analysis' approach to economic-efficiency analysis that responds appropriately to Second-Best Theory and uses it to analyze the economic efficiency of selective and universal prohibitions of every kind of antitrust-law-covered business conduct. Volume II (Chapters 13 - 15)- see Volume I, ISBN 978-3-642-24306-6 (Chapters 1 - 14). Explains why market definitions are inherently arbitrary, developsnon-market-oriented approaches to assessing the monopolizing character and competitive impact of mergers, joint ventures, and long-term requirements contracts, and criticizes the market-oriented approaches to these issues proposed byacademics and used by U.S. and E.U. courts and antitrust-enforcement agencies. Defines 'oligopolistic' and 'predatory' conduct, analyzes the determinants of the profitability of all variants of such conduct, examines the evidence that can and cannot be used to prove that defendants have engaged in them, and criticizes the contrary tests for predation and illegal oligopolistic conduct that academics and U.S. and E.U. courts and enforcement-agencies have proposed/used. Delineates the legitimate functions of vertical integration, (B) examinesthe ability of various horizontal pricing techniques, resale price maintenance, and vertical territorial restraints and customer-allocation clauses, other sorts of contractual provisions and sales policies that are designed to reduceindependent retailers to promote a producer's product, and long-term full-requirements contracts can perform these functions, (C) examines the legal implications of the foregoing analyses under both U.S. and E.U. antitrust law, and (D) criticizes the contrary analyses and conclusions of scholars and U.S. and E.U. courts and antitrust-enforcement agencies. Provides a comprehensive account and comparison of U.S. antitrust law and E.U. competition law both as written and as applied (which points out the purely legal as well as the legal/economic errors that U.S. and E.U. authorities have made when interpreting and applying respectively the U.S. statutes and the E.U. treaty), and examines whetherhistorically and contemporaneously these errors make U.S. and E.U. antitrust law differ more as applied than they differ as written. Is self-contained, combines sophisticated economic analysis with sophisticated legal analysis, provides clear operational definitions of all the economic and legal concepts it uses, relies primarily on verbal explanations, and when it uses mathematics, limits itself mathematically to arithmetical examples and two-dimensional diagrams. INDICE: Introduction to This Study: This Study’s Coverage and Distinctive Features. Chapter 12: Horizontal Mergers and Acquisitions. Chapter 13: Conglomerate Mergers and Acquisitions. Chapter 14: Vertical Mergers and the Pricing Techniques, Contract-of-Sale Provisions, and Sales-Policies That Are SurrogatesFor Vertical Integration. Chapter 15: Joint Ventures and Other Types of Functionally-Analogous Collaborative Arrangements.

• ISBN: 978-3-642-24312-7
• Editorial: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
• Encuadernacion: Cartoné
• Páginas: 340
• Fecha Publicación: 31/01/2012
• Nº Volúmenes: 1
• Idioma: Inglés