Economics and the interpretation and application of U.S. and E.U. antitrust law v. I Basic concepts and economics-based analyses of the legality of oligopolistic and predatory conduct

Volume I. This book (1) delineates operational definitions of (A) the key concepts in the U.S.'/E.U.'s respective tests of antitrust illegality and (B) such other antitrust-law-related economic concepts as 'oligopolistic' and 'predatory' conduct, (2) analyzes the profitability of oligopolistic and predatory conduct and the evidence that can and cannot establish that they have been practiced, (3) explains why market definitions are inherently arbitrary and criticizes the market-oriented approaches that U.S. and E.U. antitrust-enforcement officials have used to predict the competitive impact of horizontal mergers and the possible foreclosing effects of long-term requirements contracts, (4) explains the various functions that vertical integration can perform and the ability of various types of pricing techniques, vertical contractual restraints, and sales policies to perform those functions, (5) describes U.S. antitrust law and E.U. competition law as written, (6) summarizes and criticizes the ways inwhich the U.S./E.U. authorities have interpreted and applied the U.S./E.U. antitrust statutes/treaty, and (7) compares U.S. and E.U. antitrust law both as written and as applied. Explains why market definitions are inherently arbitrary, develops non-market-oriented approaches to assessing the monopolizing character and competitive impact of mergers, joint ventures, and long-term requirements contracts, andcriticizes the market-oriented approaches to these issues proposed by academics and used by U.S. and E.U. courts and antitrust-enforcement agencies. Defines 'oligopolistic' and 'predatory' conduct, analyzes the determinants of the profitability of all variants of such conduct, examines the evidence that can and cannot be used to prove that defendants have engaged in them, and criticizesthe contrary tests for predation and illegal oligopolistic conduct that academics and U.S. and E.U. courts and enforcement-agencies have proposed/used. Delineates the legitimate functions of vertical integration, (B) examines the ability of various horizontal pricing techniques, resale price maintenance, and vertical territorial restraints and customer-allocation clauses, other sorts ofcontractual provisions and sales policies that are designed to reduce independent retailers to promote a producer's product, and long-term full-requirements contracts can perform these functions, (C) examines the legal implications of the foregoing analyses under both U.S. and E.U. antitrust law, and (D) criticizes the contrary analyses and conclusions of scholars and U.S. and E.U. courts and antitrust-enforcement agencies. Provides a comprehensive account and comparison of U.S. antitrust law and E.U. competition law both as written and asapplied (which points out the purely legal as well as the legal/economic errors that U.S. and E.U. authorities have made when interpreting and applying respectively the U.S. statutes and the E.U. treaty), and examines whether historically and contemporaneously these errors make U.S. and E.U. antitrust law differ more as applied than they differ as written. Is self-contained, combines sophisticated economic analysis with sophisticated legal analysis, provides clear operational definitions of all the economic and legal concepts it uses, relies primarily on verbal explanations, and when it uses mathematics, limits itself mathematically to arithmetical examples and two-dimensional diagrams. INDICE: Introduction to This Study: This Study’s Coverage and Distinctive Features. Introduction to Part I: Basic Concepts and Approaches. Chapter 1: The “Correct” Definition of “The Impact of a Choice on Economic Efficiency”. Chapter 2: The Components of the Difference Between a Firm’s Price and Conventional Marginal Costs and the Intermediate Determinants of the Intensity of Quality-and-Variety-Increasing-Investment Competition. Chapter 3: The Definitions of“Monopolizing Conduct,” “Attempts to Monopolize,” and “Exclusionary Abuses”. Chapter 4: The Conduct-Coverage of, Tests of Legality Promulgated by, and Defenses (U.S. Spelling) or Defences (British Spelling) Recognized by U.S. Antitrust Law and E.C./E.U. Competition law. Chapter 5: The Categories of Economic-Efficiency Gains Whose Generation by Business Conduct Respectively Are and Are Not Relevant to the Conduct’s Antitrust Legality. Chapter 6: The Inevitable Arbitrariness of Market Definitions and the Unjustifiability of Market-Oriented Antitrust Analyses. Chapter 7: Economic and Antitrust Markets: Their Abstract Definition, Their Delimitability, and the Methods That Have Been Proposed and Used to Identify Concrete Exemplars. Chapter 8: The Operational Definition of AFirm’s Monopoly Power, Oligopoly Power, and Total (Market) Power in a Given ARDEPPS. Chapter 9: The Need to Analyze Separately the Monopolizing Character, “Abusiveness,” Competitive Impact, and Economic Efficiency of Business Choices. Chapter 10: Oligopolistic Conduct. Chapter 11: Predatory Conduct.

• ISBN: 978-3-642-24306-6
• Editorial: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
• Encuadernacion: Cartoné
• Páginas: 740
• Fecha Publicación: 31/01/2012
• Nº Volúmenes: 1
• Idioma: Inglés