Over recent years, the psychology of concepts has been rejuvenated by new work on prototypes, inventive ideas on causal cognition, the development of neo-empiricist theories of concepts, and the inputs of the budding neuropsychologyof concepts. But our empirical knowledge about concepts has yet to be organized in a coherent framework. In Doing without Concepts , Edouard Machery arguesthat the dominant psychological theories of concepts fail to provide such a framework and thatdrastic conceptual changes are required to make sense of the research on concepts in psychology and neuropsychology. Over recent years, the psychology of concepts has been rejuvenated by new work on prototypes, inventive ideas on causal cognition, the development of neo-empiricist theories of concepts, and theinputs of the budding neuropsychology of concepts. But our empirical knowledge about concepts has yet to be organized in a coherent framework.In Doing without Concepts, Edouard Machery argues that the dominant psychological theories of concepts fail to provide such a framework and that drastic conceptual changes are required to make sense of the research on concepts in psychology and neuropsychology. Machery shows that the class of concepts divides into several distinct kinds that have little in common with one another and that for this very reason, it is a mistake to attempt to encompass all known phenomena within a singletheory of concepts. In brief, concepts are not a natural kind. Machery concludes that the theoretical notion of concept should be eliminated from the theoretical apparatus of contemporary psychology and should be replaced with theoretical notions that are more appropriate for fulfilling psychologists' goals.The notion of concept has encouraged psychologists to believe that a single theory of concepts could be developed, leading to useless theoretical controversies between the dominant paradigms of concepts. Keeping this notion would slow down, and maybe prevent, the development of a more adequate classification and would overshadow the theoretical and empirical issues that are raised by this more adequate classification. Anyone interested in cognitive science's emerging view of the mind will findMachery's provocative ideas of interest."The book is careful and provocative. Machery provides an excellent review ofmajor issues in the psychological literature on concepts and categorization and a very useful discussion of the contrasting goals of the philosophers who study concepts and the psychologists who do." - Barbara C. Malt, Mind and Language"I thoroughly enjoyed Doing without Concepts and found it immensely illuminating. Its claims about concepts brought a number of important issues into sharper focus for me...Further, Machery's discussion of categorization is among thebest that I have seen. As a result of reading the book, I feel that I have a better grasp of what the reigning theories say, and of the experimental motivation for them. I also think that the book makes a genuine scientific advance."- Christopher S. Hill,Philosophical Studies"Machery has written a bold, original and important book. If he's right, andI suspect that he is, then both philosophers and psychologists who write about concepts will have to do some quite fundamental rethinking. The book is an excellent example of what interdisciplinary work by a philosopher can and should be. It is philosophically sophisticated, clearly and carefully argued, andexceptionally well informed about a wide variety of empirical research." --Stephen Stich, Board of GovernorsProfessor of Philosophy & Cognitive Science, Rutgers University"Arguing that cognitive scientists should do away with concepts is like arguing that biologists should do away with genes. Machery's devastating assault has major implications for philosophy and psychology-it rattles forcefully at the foundations of these fields, and dashes the hopes of those who think we'll ever find a unified theory of thought. But it is much more than a demolition job. Machery offers a masterful, up-to-the-minute, polemical tour or recent work on learning, induction, andcategorization. His bountiful insights and arguments pave a clear and promising path for the journey beyond concepts." --Jesse Prinz, CUNY Graduate CenterList of FiguresList of TablesPrefaceAcknowledgmentsPermissionsChapter 1. Concepts in Psychology1. "Concept" in Psychology2. Evidence for the Existence of Concepts3. What is a Psychological Theory of Concepts?4. Alternative Characterizations of the Notion of ConceptChapter 2. Concepts in Philosophy1. "Concept" in Philosophy2. Concepts in Philosophy versus Concepts in Psychology3. How are the Psychological and the Philosophical Theories of Concepts Connected? Peacocke's Simple Account4. How are the Psychological and the Philosophical Theories of Concepts Connected? The Foundationalist AccountChapter 3. The Heterogeneity Hypothesis1. The Received View2. The Heterogeneity Hypothesis3. Hybrid Theories of ConceptsChapter 4. Three Fundamental Kinds of Concepts: Prototypes, Exemplars, Theories1. The Classical Theory of concepts2. The Prototype Paradigm of Concepts3. The Exemplar Paradigm of Concepts4. The Theory Paradigm of Concepts5. Alternative Views of Concepts6. Three Theoretical Entities that Have Little in CommonChapter 5. Multi-Process Theories1. Multi-Process Theories2. Examples of Multi-Process TheoriesChapter 6. Categorization and Concept Learning1. Categorization and Concept Learning2. Studying Categorization and Concept Learning3. Evidence for the Existence of Prototypes4. Evidence for the Existence of Exemplars5. Evidence for the Existence of Theories6. Organization of the Categorization Processes and of the Concept Learning ProcessesChapter 7. Induction, Concept Combination, Neuropsychology1. Induction2. Concept Combination3. NeuropsychologyChapter 8. Concept Eliminativism1. Two Inconclusive Arguments against the Notion of Concept2. Natural Kinds and Scientific Eliminativism3. The Argument for the Elimination of "Concept"4. Objections and RepliesConclusionReferencesIndex of NamesIndex of Subjects Even if one is not convinced by Machery's idea that concepts are not natural kinds, and that'concept' needs to be eliminated from the vocabulary of psychology, Doing without Concepts might still be taken as convincingly showing that in their search for the properties common to most or all concepts, psychologists have been looking in the wrong place.
- ISBN: 978-0-19-983756-4
- Editorial: Oxford University
- Encuadernacion: Rústica
- Páginas: 296
- Fecha Publicación: 04/08/2011
- Nº Volúmenes: 1
- Idioma: Inglés