Written for advanced undergraduate and graduate students, this is the first textbook on international relations theory to take a specifically game-theoretic approach to the subject, and provide the material needed for students to understand the subject thoroughly, from its basic foundations to more complex models. International relations theory is presented and analysed using simple games, which allow students to grasp the concepts and mechanisms involved with the rationalist approach without the distraction of complicated mathematics. Chapter exercises reinforce key concepts and guide students to extend the models discussed. Drawing examples from international security, international political economy, and environmental negotiations, this introductory textbook examines a broad array of topics in international relations courses, including state preferences, normal form games, bargaining, uncertainty and communication, multilateral cooperation, and the impact of domestic politics. This is the first textbook to unify rationalist scholarship in international relations theory into a complete introduction, with consistent style, level and notation, rather than through a diverse set of articles, written at various levels and in various styles Students do not need a strong background in game theory to engage with this text Utility functions, equilibrium boundaries, cut-off points and other derived quantities are illustrated in figures Chapter conclusions lead students to further research, through a discussion of how the basic models presented in the chapter have been developed in various directions, and where current research interest lies
- ISBN: 9781107694231
- Editorial: CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
- Encuadernacion: Rústica
- Páginas: 249
- Fecha Publicación: 01/01/2015
- Nº Volúmenes: 1
- Idioma: