Many philosophers who deny the objectivity of ethics have sought to base their arguments on non-ethical considerations. They take themselves to be impugning the intellectual solidity of ethical claims and values without advancing anysuch claims or endorsing any such values in the course of their reflections. Many champions of ethical objectivity have responded in kind by adducing alternative non-ethical considerations. In this major new work, Matthew Kramer seeks to establish two main conclusions. On the one hand, moral requirements are strongly objective in a number of senses that are expounded at length. On the other hand, the objectivity of ethics is itself an ethical matter that rests primarily on ethical considerations. That is, it is not something that can adequately be contested or confirmed through non-ethical reasoning. Moral realism -the doctrine that morality is indeed objective - is a moral doctrine. Indeed,Kramer argues that issues about the objectivity of ethics are typically more abstract than the familiar ethical problems that confront people from day to day. Nevertheless, those key questions concerning objectivity are not only about the domain of ethics - crucially they are also within it. Distinguished by its originality, ambition and quality of scholarship, Moral Realism as a Moral Doctrine will be of interest to a wide range of readers in metaethics and moral philosophy more broadly.
- ISBN: 978-1-4051-9402-0
- Editorial: Wiley-Blackwell
- Encuadernacion: Cartoné
- Páginas: 400
- Fecha Publicación: 09/04/2009
- Nº Volúmenes: 1
- Idioma: Inglés