Regulating competition in stock markets: antitrust measures to promote fairness and transparency through investor protection and crisis prevention

A guide to curbing monopoly power in stock marketsEngaging and informative, Regulating Competition in Stock Markets skillfully analyzes the impact of the recent global financial crisis on health and happiness, and uses this opportunity to put regulatory systems in perspective. Happiness is lost because of emotional and physical health deterioration resulting from the crisis. Therefore, the authors conclude that financial crisis prevention should be the focus of public policy.This book is the most comprehensive study so far on potential risks to the stock market, especially various forms of market manipulation that lead to mania and eventual crisis. Based on litigation cases from internationalstock markets, and borrowing multidisciplinary findings in the fields of finance, economics, accounting, media studies, criminology, legal studies, psychology, and medicine, this book is the first to provide thorough micro-level regulatory proposals rooted in financial reality. By focusing on securities trading, they apply antitrust measures to limiting monopolistic power that is used for the manipulation of investors' perception and monopolistic profit. These proposals are quantifiable, adjustable, inexpensive, and can be easily implemented by any securities regulating agency for real-time oversight and daily operations.The recommendations found here are intended to improve the fairness and transparency of the financial markets, thereby perfecting the market competition, protecting investors, stabilizing the market, and preventing crisesExplores how avoiding crises can to contribute to a more scientific, health aware, and civilized economic and social developmentWritten by a team of authors who have extensive experience in this dynamic field, including Nobel Laureate Lawrence R. KleinSince the founding of the first, organized stock exchange in Amsterdam 400 years ago, no systematic economic research results on stock markets have been implemented in stock market regulation around the world. Regulating Competition in Stock Markets aims to fill this void. INDICE: Foreword by Franklin AllenIntroductionAcknowledgmentsChapter 1: Does the Recent Financial Crisis Impact Health and Happiness? (Xin Yan, LawrenceR. Klein, Viktoria Dalko, Ferenc Gyurcsány, Michael H. Wang and Christine Huang)Concepts of HappinessThe History of Modeling Health and Financial CrisisOurThree ObjectivesOur Financial Crisis Impact ModelResultsFinancial Crisis as aMajor International Traumatic EventCan We Just Wait for the Next Financial Crisis?NotesChapter 2: Profound Unhappiness in the International RecessionThe Case of Suicide in Industrialized Countries (M. Harvey Brenner)BackgroundTwo Concepts of HappinessA Psychological ViewpointUnhappiness, Hopelessness and DepressionHypothesis: Happiness as Accomplishment Predicts Happiness as PleasureAnalysisConclusionsChapter 3: Preventing Stock Market Crises (I)Regulating Share Holding Concentration (Xin Yan, Lawrence R. Klein, Viktoria Dalko, Ferenc Gyurcsány and Michael H. Wang)Is Perfect Competition Possible in the Stock Market?Concentration, Manipulation, and MonopolyCan Stock Markets Still be Manipulated?Theoretical Literature on Market ManipulationWe choose the Accumulation-Lift-Distribution (A-L-D) scheme to studyManipulative Objective of Each Stage of the A-L-D SchemeAre Monopolistic Practices Involved in the A-L-D Scheme?Antitrust Against A-L-D ManipulationExisting Approach and our Proposal to Regulate Market ManipulationRegulatory Proposal: A Generic RecommendationBenefits of Regulating ConcentrationConcluding Remarks and Future ResearchNotesChapter 4: Preventing Stock Market Crises (II)Regulating Trade-based Price-lifting (Xin Yan, Lawrence R. Klein, Viktoria Dalko, Ferenc Gyurcsány and Michael H. Wang)How isLarge Price Impact by other Investors Induced?Empirical Research on Volume-based Price ImpactThe SEBI Prosecution CasesThe Manipulation Tactics Used in Price-liftingAnatomy of an Investor's Trades in a Stock During a Trading DayUnified Approach to Surveillance and Regulatory MeasuresSelling Speed in Distribution and Short-sellingConcluding RemarksNotesChapter 5: Preventing Stock Market Crises (III)Regulating Earnings Manipulation (Xin Yan, Lawrence R. Klein, Viktoria Dalko, Ferenc Gyurcsány and Michael H. Wang)How Important is Earnings Information to Investors?Earnings Manipulation is ProblematicHow is Earnings Manipulation Done in Reality?Earnings Manipulation is PervasiveEarnings Manipulation is PersistentAuditors Frequently Fail to Stop Earnings ManipulationProposals to Effectively Regulate Earnings ManipulationConcluding RemarksNotesChapter 6: Preventing Stock Market Crises (IV)Regulating Trading by Corporate Insiders(Xin Yan, Lawrence R. Klein, Viktoria Dalko, Ferenc Gyurcsány and Michael H. Wang)What is the Purpose of Trading by Corporate Insiders?The Relationship Between Earnings Manipulation and Trading by Corporate InsidersTrading by Corporate Insiders is an Important Drive for Earnings ManipulationInsider Trading with Earnings Manipulation is not Effectively RegulatedInformation Monopoly and Information AsymmetryProposals to Regulate Effectively Trading by Corporate InsidersDiscussion of the Four Proposed MeasuresConclusionNotesChapter 7: Preventing Stock Market Crises (V)Regulating Information Manipulation by Sell-Side Analysts (Xin Yan, Lawrence R. Klein, Viktoria Dalko, Ferenc Gyurcsány and Michael H. Wang)What is the Actual Role of Sell-side Analysts?How is the Value of Sell-side Analysts' Work Defined?Analysts Can Hardly Attend to Public InterestsFairlyAnalyst-generated Information Benefits the InformedValue of Analysts' Recommendation and Forecast to IssuersValue of Analysts' Work to Investment Banks and Brokerage FirmsComparison of Sell-side Analysts and Corporate InsidersLegal Difficulty in Prosecuting Wrongdoing by Sell-side AnalystsRegulatory ProposalsDiscussion of the Regulatory ProposalsConcluding RemarksNotesChapter 8: Preventing Stock Market Crises (VI)Regulating Information-Based Manipulation (Xin Yan, Lawrence R. Klein, Viktoria Dalko, Ferenc Gyurcsány and Michael H. Wang)All Types of Market Manipulation Comes Down to Perception ManipulationAnatomy of SEC Market Manipulation Litigation Cases (1999 - 2009)Information-based Manipulation Schemes in PracticeInformation-based Manipulation Schemes on the InternetAnalysis of Information-based ManipulationRegulatory RecommendationsDiscussion of Information Monopoly in RealityConcluding RemarksA Perspective for Future ResearchNotesChapter 9: Preventing Stock Market Crises (VII)Principles of Regulating News Reporting That Cultivates Long-Run Manias and Triggers Short-Run Panics (Xin Yan, Lawrence R. Klein, Viktoria Dalko, Ferenc Gyurcsány, and Michael H. Wang)Information Monopoly and Certain Business News ReportingA Prolonged Mania in Stock-buying Leads to a Market Wide CrisisSome Business News Reporting is Capable of Moving Stock Prices in the Short-runSome Business NewsReporting Affects Individual Investors in the Long RunWhy is Business News Reporting Usually Upward Biased?Proposed Principles to Regulate Relevant Business Journalists and Mass Media 9Empirical Research on Impact of Some Breaking News on Stock MarketsTrading Halts, Circuit Breakers and Price Limits: Effectiveness and LimitationsRegulatory Principles in Case of Breaking NewsConcluding RemarksNotesAbout the AuthorsIndex

• ISBN: 978-1-118-09481-5
• Editorial: John Wiley & Sons
• Encuadernacion: Cartoné
• Páginas: 368
• Fecha Publicación: 20/06/2012
• Nº Volúmenes: 1
• Idioma: Inglés