Kant and the ethics of humility: a story of dependence, corruption and virtue

In previous years, philosophers have either ignored the virtue of humility orfound it to be in need of radical redefinition. But humility is a central human virtue, and it is the purpose of this book to defend that claim from a Kantian point of view. Jeanine Grenberg argues that we can indeed speak of Aristotelian-style, but still deeply Kantian, virtuous character traits. She proposesmoving from focus on action to focus on person, not leaving the former behind, but instead taking it up within a larger, more satisfying Kantian moral theory. Using examples from literature as well as philosophy, she shows that thereis a Kantian virtue theory to be explored in which humility plays a central role. Her book will have a wide appeal to readers not only in Kant studies but also in theological ethics and moral psychology. INDICE: Introduction; Part I. Kantian Virtue: 1. Dependent and corrupt rational agency; 2. Constraints on any possible Kantian account of virtue; 3. A Kantian account of virtue; Part II. A Kantian Response to Recent Accounts of Humility: 4. A Kantian response to recent accounts of humility; Part III: The Kantian Virtue of Humility: 5. The Kantian virtue of humility; 6. Humility and self-respect; 7. The humble person; Part IV. The Virtues of Kantian Humility: 8. The humble pursuit of self-knowledge; 9. The humble pursuit of respect for persons; Conclusion.

• ISBN: 978-0-521-13121-6
• Editorial: Cambridge University
• Encuadernacion: Rústica
• Páginas: 284
• Fecha Publicación: 11/03/2010
• Nº Volúmenes: 1
• Idioma: Inglés