Collective decision making: views from social choice and game theory
Deemen, Adrian van
Rusinowska, Agnieszka
INDICE: From Black's Advice and Arrow's Theorem to the Gibbard-Satterthewaite Result.- The Impact of Forcing Preferences Rankings when Indifference Exists.- Connections and Implications of the Ostrogorski Paradox for Spatial VotingModels.- Maximal Domain for Maskin Monotone Pareto Optimal and Anonymous Choice Rules.- Extremal Restriction, Condorcet Sets, and Majority Decision Making.- Rights Revisited, and Limited.- Some General Results on Responsibility for Outcomes.- Existence of a Dictatorial Subgropu in Social Choice with Independent Subgroup Utility Scales, an Alternative Proof.- Makint (Non-Standard) Choices.- Puzzles and Paradoxes Involving Averages.- Voting Weights, Thresholds and Population Size.- Stabilizing Power Sharing.- Different Approaches to Influence Based on Social Networks and Simple Games.- Networks, Information and Choice.- Characterizations of Bargaining Solutions by Properties of Their Status QuoSets.- Monotonicity Properties of Interval Solutions and the Dutta-Ray-Solution for Convex Interval Games.
- ISBN: 978-3-642-02864-9
- Editorial: Springer
- Encuadernacion: Cartoné
- Páginas: 290
- Fecha Publicación: 01/04/2010
- Nº Volúmenes: 1
- Idioma: Inglés