This is the most comprehensive and up-to-date investigation of moral and conceptual questions about lying and deception. Carson argues that there is a moral presumption against lying and deception that causes harm, he examines case-studies from business, politics, and history, and he offers a qualified defenceof the view that honesty is a virtue. INDICE: Introduction and Précis; PART I: CONCEPTS; 1: Lying; Introduction; 1.1 My Definition of Lying; 1.I.1: Lies and Falsehoods; 1.I.2: Falsehoods and Lies; 1.I.3: A Reformulation of the Dictionary Definitions; 1.I.4: Lying and the Right to Know the Truth; 1.I.5: That the Intent to Deceive is not Necessary for Lying; 1.I.6: Chisholm and Feehan's Definition; 1.I.7: My Definition of Lying (A Preliminary Version); 1.I.8: 'A Defence of the Transparency Thesis'; 1.I.9: The Concept of Warranting; 1.I.10: Conditions for Warranting the Truth of a Statement; 1.I.11: Yet Another Revision; 1.I.12: A Complication of My Final Definition; 1.I.13: Some Comments on this Definition; 1.I.14: An Objection: The Concept of Assertion ; Fried; Williams; Chisholm and Feehan; 1.I.15: Reasons to Accept my Definition; 1.II Replies to Criticisms of My Definition; 1.II.1: Sorensen; 1.II.2: Fallis; Conclusions; Endnotes; 2. Deception and Related Concepts; Introduction; 2.I Deception; 2.I.2: Several Objections and Modified Versions of My Definition; 2.I.3: Some Considerations Relevant to Later Parts of the Book; 2.II Keeping Someone in the Dark; 2.III The Relationship between Lying, Deception, Keeping Someone in the Dark, Concealing Information, and Withholding Information; 2.III.1: The Difference between Lying and Deception; 2.III.2: Deception Versus Witholding Information; 2.III.3: Concealing Information, Withholding Information, and Deception; 2.IV Two Related Notions: 'Spin' and 'Half-Truths'; 2.V Bullshit; 2.V.1: Frankfurt on Bullshit, Deception, and Lying; 2.V.2: Bullshit and Lack of Concern with the Truth; 2.V.3: Bullshit Does Not Require the Intention to Deceive; 2.V.4: Lying Can Constitute Producing Bullshit; 2.V.5: Bullshitters Can be Concerned with the Truth of What they Say; 2.VI A Very Brief Note on Honesty; Endnotes; PART II: MORAL THEORY; IIA NORMATIVE ETHICAL THEORY; 3. Kant and the Absolute Prohibition against Lying; Introduction; 3.I Kant's Categorical Imperative; 3.I.1: The Universal Law Formulation of the Categorical Imperative; 3.I.2: Perfect and Imperfect Duties; 3.I.3:The Second and Third Versions of the Categorical Imperative; 3.II What Kant Says about the Morality of Lying; 3.II.1: The Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals (1785); 3.II.2: Metaphysics of Morals (1797); 3.II.3: 'On a Supposed Right to Lie from Philanthropic Concerns'; 3.II.4: Allan Wood's Alternative Reading of 'On a Supposed Right.. '; 3.II.5: Lectures on Ethics; 3.III Does the First Version of the Categorical Imperative Imply that Lying is Always Wrong?; 3.IV Does the Second Version of the Categorical Imperative Imply that Lying is Always Wrong?; 3.V A Rossian Argument for Thinking that Lying is Sometimes Morally Permissable; Conclusions; Endnotes; 4. Act-Utilitarianism; Introduction; 4.I The Definition of (Act) Utilitarianism; Act and Rule Utilitarianism/Consequentialism; 4.II Guide to Action Versus Criterion of Right and Wrong; 4.III The Implications of Act-Utilitarianism
- ISBN: 978-0-19-957741-5
- Editorial: Oxford University
- Encuadernacion: Cartoné
- Páginas: 304
- Fecha Publicación: 29/04/2010
- Nº Volúmenes: 1
- Idioma: Inglés