Does thought have distinctive experiential features? Is there, in addition to sensory phenomenology, a kind of cognitive phenomenology--phenomenology of acognitive or conceptual character? Leading philosophers of mind debate whether conscious thought has cognitive phenomenology and whether it is part of conscious perception and conscious emotion. It is widely agreed that there is sucha thing as sensory phenomenology and imagistic phenomenology. The central concern of the cognitive phenomenology debate is whether there is a distinctive 'cognitive phenomenology'--that is, a kind of phenomenology that has cognitive or conceptual character in some sense that needs to be precisely determined. This volume presents new work by leading philosophers in the field, and addresses the question of whether conscious thought hascognitive phenomenology. It also includes a number of essays which consider whether cognitive phenomenology is part of conscious perception and conscious emotion.Three broad themes run through the volume. First, some authors focus on the question of how the notion of cognitive phenomenology ought to be understood. How should the notion of cognitive phenomenology be defined? Are there different kinds of cognitive phenomenology? A second theme concerns the existence of cognitive phenomenology. Some contributors defend the existence of a distinctive cognitive phenomenology, whereas others deny it. The arguments for and against theexistence of cognitive phenomenology raise questions concerning the nature offirst-person knowledge of thought, the relationship between consciousness andintentionality, and the scope of the explanatory gap. A third theme concerns the implications of the cognitive phenomenology debate. What are the implications of thedebate for accounts of our introspective access to conscious thought and for accounts of the very nature of conscious thought? Cognitive Phenomenology brings the debate to the forefront of philosophy, and provides a state-of-the-art account of the issues at stake. INDICE: Contents Cognitive Phenomenology: An Introduction The Case AgainstCognitive Phenomenology From Agentive Phenomenology to Cognitive Phenomenology: A Guide for the Perplexed Cognitive Phenomenology as the Basis of Unconscious Content On The Phenomenology of Thought The Phenomenology of Particularity Introspection, Phenomenality, and the Availability of Intentional Content The Sensory Basis of Cognitive Phenomenology A Frugal View of Cognitive Phenomenology On Behalf of Cognitive Qualia Phenomenal Thought Disagreement about Cognitive Phenomenology Cognitive Phenomenology: real life Is There a Phenomenology of Thought? Phenomenology of Consciously Thinking
- ISBN: 978-0-19-957993-8
- Editorial: Oxford University
- Encuadernacion: Cartoné
- Páginas: 400
- Fecha Publicación: 24/11/2011
- Nº Volúmenes: 1
- Idioma: Inglés