Evidence, explanation, and realism: essays in philosophy of science

The 15 essays in this volume by the distinguished philosopher of science Peter Achinstein address three fundamental questions: What is required for a fact to be evidence for a scientific hypothesis? What is involved in giving a scientific explanation of a phenomenon? And should scientific theories be construedas aiming to correctly describe the entire world or only the observable partsof it? INDICE: PART I: EVIDENCE AND INDUCTION; 1.: Concepts of Evidence; 2.: Why Philosophical Theories of Evidence are (and ought to be) Ignored by Scientests; 3.: The Grue Paradox; 4.: The War on Induction; 5.: Waves and the Scientific Method; PART 2: EXPLANATION; 6.: An Illocutionary Theory of Explanation; 7.: The Pragmatic Character of Explanation; 8.: Can there be a Model of Explanation?; 9.: Explanation vs. Prediction: Which Carries More Weight?; 10.: Function Statements; PART 3: REALISM, MOLECULES, AND ELECTRONS; 11.: Is there a Valid Experimental Argument for Scientific Realism?; 12.:. Jean Perrin and Molecular Reality; 13.: The Problem of Theoretical Terms; 14.: What to do if you wantto Defend a Theory you can't Prove: A Method of Physical Speculation; 15.: Who Really Discovered the Electron?

• ISBN: 978-0-19-973525-9
• Editorial: Oxford University
• Encuadernacion: Cartoné
• Páginas: 344
• Fecha Publicación: 17/06/2010
• Nº Volúmenes: 1
• Idioma: Inglés